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S E C R E T ATHENS 5513

EXDIS

GENEVA FOR HARTMAN

FOR SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR GR TU CY

SUBJ: GREECE, CYPRUS AND GENEVA PHASE II

1. AS THE PARTICIPANTS ASSEMBLE FOR PHASE II OF THE GENEVA TALKS ON CYPRUS, AND IN THE LIGHT OF THE HARTMAN TALKS WITH GREEK LEADERS DURING THE PAST TWO DAYS, FOLLOWING IS OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE GREEK POSITION.

2. THE TIMING OF THE CYPRUS CRISIS CREATES BOTH ADVANTAGES AND PROBLEMS FOR KARAMANLIS. ON THE ONE HAND, THE CRISIS BROUGHT DOWN THE MILITARY RULERS OF GREECE AND RETURNED HIM TO OFFICE ON THE STRENGTH OF A VIRTUALLY UNPRECEDENTED AND QUITE TEMPORARY NATIONAL CONSENSUS. ON THE OTHER HAND, IN CREATING THE CONDITIONS FOR HIS RETURN THE CRISIS IMPLICITLY DEFINED THE LIMITS OF HIS MANDATE. THE UNWISDOM OF THE IOANNIDES GOVERNMENT IN PROVOKING THE CRISIS PROVIDES KARAMANLIS WITH POLITICAL TOLERANCES THAT WOULD NOT OTHERWISE EXIST. UP TO A CERTAIN POINT HE CAN ACCEPT COMPROMISE UNFAVORABLE TO THE GREEKS (OR AT LEAST LESS FAVORABLE THAN THE STATUS QUO ANTE

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ON CYPRUS) WITHOUT PAYING AN UNACCEPTABLE POLITICAL PRICE.

BEYOND THAT POINT THE PROBLEM BECOMES HIS AND HE CAN NO LONGER EXPLAIN AWAY HIS ACTIONS BY CLAIMING TO BE CLEANING UP A MESS LEFT BY THE COLONELS. IT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PAYING THE DEBTS OF OTHERS AND INCURRING NEW ONES HIMSELF.

3. WHILE IT IS LIKELY THAT KARAMANLIS HIMSELF IS UNSURE HOW FAR HE CAN GO IN ACCEPTING MODIFICATION OF THE 1960 LONDON-ZURICH ACCORDS, HIS REMARKS DURING THE HARTMAN TALKS CLEARLY INDICATE THAT HE, AND OTHER MEMBERS OF HIS GOVERNMENT, HAVE ALREADY ACCEPTED THE FACT THAT SOME MODIFICATION IS INEVITABLE. THIS IS A NET PLUS FOR ALL OF US BECAUSE IT MEANS THAT, HOWEVER DIFFICULT GENEVA PHASE II MAY BE, A RATIONAL BASIS FOR COMPROMISE EXISTS ON THE GREEK SIDE. WHEN KARAMANLIS QUOTED BISMARCK TO HARTMAN AND SPOKE OF THE NEED TO AVOID A SETTLEMENT HUMILIATING TO GREECE HE WAS TELLING US IN CLEAR TERMS THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT ADJUSTMENTS IN THE CYPRUS ACCORDS FAVORABLE TO TURKEY, BUT THAT THE TURKS MUST UNDERSTAND THAT HIS OWN POWER TO COMPROMISE DEPENDED ON TURKISH SELF-RESTRAINT.

4. IN OUR VIEW, KARAMANLIS CAN IN FACT LIVE WITH RELATIVELY SIGNIFICANT MODIFICATIONS OF THE INTERCOMMUNAL GROUND RULES IN CYPRUS. HE CANNOT LIVE WITH--OR PERHAPS SURVIVE--DEGRADATIONS OF GREEK, AS OPPOSED TO GREEK CYPRIOT PRESTIGE AND COMPETENCE ADJUSTMENTS IN GREEK-TURKISH BILATERAL RELATIONS CONSPICUOUSLY FAVORABLE TO THE TURKS, OR ACTIONS SUGGESTING TURKISH HEGEMONY IN THE AEGEAN.

5. FROM THE AMERICAN STANDPOINT THE LIMITS OF HIS POSITION SHOULD CREATE MORE OPPORTUNITIES THAN PROBLEMS. KARAMANLIS, AVEROFF AND MAVROS HAVE ALL TOLD US THAT THEY REGARD ENOSIS AND PARTITION AS EQUALLY UNREALISTIC SOLUTIONS TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM, BUT THAT WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A SOVEREIGN CYPRUS ALMOST ANY INTERCOMMUNAL ARRANGEMENT IS NEGOTIABLE. AS KARAMANLIS AND AVEROFF MADE CLEAR TO HARTMAN, THEY ARE ALSO MINDFUL OF THE WIDER WESTERN SECURITY INTERESTS AFFECTED BY GREEK-TURKISH CONFRONTATION OVER CYPRUS AND WISH TO ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT THAT BOLSTERS

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THE EASTERN FLANK OF NATO RATHER THAN WEAKENING IT. IN DISCUSSING CYPRUS WITH THE GREEK LEADERSHIP WE ARE THEREFORE PROCEEDING ON THE BASIS OF SHARED ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT WHERE GREECE'S VITAL INTERESTS LIE AND A COMMON PERCEPTION OF THE LARGER ISSUES INVOLVED.

6. IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT THIS BE UNDERSTOOD IN ANKARA, FOR IF THE TURKS REALIZE THAT THE GREEK GOVERNMENT HAS

ALREADY, AT LEAST TACITLY, ACCEPTED THE NEED TO ENHANCE THE STATUS OF THE TURKISH-CYPRIOT COMMUNITY THEY MAY BE PREPARED TO RELAX THE MILITARY AND RHETORICAL PRESSURES THAT THREATEN THE GREEK GOVERNMENT IN AREAS WHERE IT IS MOST VULNERABLE. AS ANKARA KNOWS, KARAMANLIS AND AVEROFF WERE THE GREEK ARCHITECTS OF THE ONLY REAL DETENTE THAT HAS EXISTED BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY IN MODERN HISTORY. ANY ALTERNATIVE GREEK LEADERSHIP, WHETHER CIVILIAN OR MILITARY, WOULD BE LESS INTERESTED IN DISPOSING OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM EXPEDITIOUSLY IF ONLY BECAUSE NO ALTERNATIVE LEADERS WOULD HAVE AS MUCH INVESTED IN IT.

7. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND WE DRAW THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS:

(A) THE PRESENT GREEK GOVERNMENT WILL BE REALISTIC IN ACCEPTING MODIFICATIONS IN THE 1960 ACCORDS FAVORABLE TO THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS (AND BY EXTENSION TO TURKEY); (B) THE GREEKS HOWEVER WILL STRONGLY RESIST TURKISH MOVES WHICH THEY INTERPRET AS DIRECT CHALLENGES TO GREECE OR DESTRUCTIVE OF CYPRIOT SOVEREIGNTY. THIS SUGGESTS THAT THE TURKS ARE IN A POSITION TO ACHIEVE WHAT THEY DEFINE AS THEIR BASIC OBJECTIVES IN CYPRUS IF THEY DO NOT RPT NOT TRY TO PUSH THE GREEKS TO THE WALL. HERE, AS ELSEWHERE, LE MIEUX EST L'ENNEMI DU BIEN AND FINESSE AND A SHOW OF SELF-RESTRAINT IS LIKELY TO GAIN MORE OF LASTING BENEFIT THAN GOING FOR BROKE. GIVEN THIS ATTITUDE ON THE PART OF THE TURKS, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO MOVE RELATIVELY FAST AT GENEVA OR THEREAFTER IN ACHIEVING A VIABLE SETTLEMENT. KARAMANLIS WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY PREFER TO DISPOSE OF CYPRUS AS AN ISSUE SOONER RATHER THAN LATER. HE HAS A CROWDED DOMESTIC AGENDA AND, IN ADDITION, WILL FIND IT EASIER TO RATIONALIZE CONCESSIONS TO THE TURKISH-CYPRIOTS NOW, WHEN THE MEMORY OF THE COLONELS' FOLLY IS FRESH, THAN HE WILL IN THE FUTURE. LASTLY, WE SUSPECT THAT THE DOUBTS AND UNCERTAINTIES THAT CHARACTERIZE THE MANDATE OF BOTH KARAMANLIS AND
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ECEVIT MAKE IT UNLIKELY THAT EITHER WILL BE IN A POSITION TO TAKE BOLD INITIATIVES. CLERIDES AND DENKTASH, WEAK AS THEY ARE, AND THREATENED AS THEY MAY BE BY MAKARIOS FROM THE REDOUBT OF GORSVENOR HOUSE, MUST BE ENCOURAGED TO TAKE CONSTRUCTIVE INITIATIVES THAT CAN BE SUPPORTED BY THE GREEKS AND TURKS. IF THE BEGINNINGS OF AN INTERCOMMUNAL ACCOMMODATION CAN BE MADE AT GENEVA, A USEFUL STEP WILL HAVE BEEN TAKEN IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. IT MAY THEN BE POSSIBLE TO GO ON TO A PACKAGE SETTLEMENT OF GREEK-TURKISH PROBLEMS OF THE KIND ADVOCATED BY AVEROFF BUT ALMOST CERTAINLY RENDERED UNREALIZABLE BY CONTINUED STRIFE ON THE ISLAND. TASCA

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